Bidder Behavior in Multiunit Auctions: Evidence from Swedish Treasury Auctions
- 1 April 2002
- journal article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Journal of Political Economy
- Vol. 110 (2) , 394-424
- https://doi.org/10.1086/338748
Abstract
We analyze a unique data set on multiunit auctions, which contains the actual demand schedules of the bidders as well as the auctionawards in over 400 Swedish Treasury auctions. First, we document that bidders vary their prices, bid dispersion, and the quantity demanded in response to increased uncertainty at the time of bidding. Second,we find that bid shading can be explained by a winner 19s curse 13driven model in which each bidder submits only one bid, despite the fact that the bidders in our data set use much richer bidding strategiesKeywords
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