Psychophysical Lawlike connections and their problem

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Abstract
(1) Conscious occurrents are in lawlike connection with sets of physical processes. (2) The states constituting such processes are the effects of certain physical sequences. (3) Each state of an action is an effect of a certain physical sequence. The picture of mind resulting from these propositions is in contrast to Donald Davidson's Anomalous Monism, partly in the assertion of psychophysical lawlike connection. A Wittgensteinian argument against such connection fails, as do arguments having to do with holism, indeterminacy, and rationality. The problem posed by the defended picture of mind is that of mental efficacy. It cannot be resolved by an Identity Theory, but can be resolved or alleviated by certain considerations, one of them having to do with the efficacy of persons.

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