Distribution of Benefits In Negotiation

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Abstract
Since 1972 the Foreign Service Institute of the U.S. Department of State has used a simulation to train officers in negotiation techniques. This simulation models a negotiation between two fictitious countries over six issues. Earlier research (Winham and Bovis, 1978) explored the reasons for agreement/nonagreement m this simulation. This research analyzes the results of agreed games (N = 24), principally to assess the importance of utility-maximizing behavior in negotiation. Results indicated that participants tended to equalize benefits between nations and between individuals at the expense of pursuing a strategy of utility-maximization. This research confirms the importance of norms of reciprocity and equality in negotiation. The research also suggests, particularly because of the variety between game outcomes, that the range of alternatives that negotiators will consider to be an acceptable solution is very wide indeed. The entire simulation is reproduced in the above citation. It is suitable for practical training, as well as for conducting further research on negotiation.

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