The efficiency of linear equilibria of sealed-bid double auctions
- 1 February 1991
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 53 (1) , 173-184
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(91)90147-v
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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