Competition in a Network Industry: The Telephone Industry, 1894–1910
- 1 September 1994
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Journal of Economic History
- Vol. 54 (3) , 543-572
- https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022050700015035
Abstract
The re-emergence of AT&T as the dominant firm in the telephone industry resulted from its adopting a predatory response to entrants. AT&T's strategy was effective because government regulations and capital market imperfections provided the incumbent with a first-mover advantage that prevented challengers from entering simultaneously in all markets.Keywords
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