The discourse ethic and the problem of representing nature

Publisher Website
Google Scholar
Abstract
This article critically explores what it might mean to ‘represent nature’ in discursive dialogue and whether such representation must necessarily be anthropocentric in a substantive rather than merely trivial sense. The analysis also examines whether, and to what extent, it is legitimate to inscribe ecocentric norms into the procedures of discursive dialogue as a matter of justice. Against Habermas, it is argued that the capacity for self‐directedness, however rudimentary, rather than communicative competence per se, should be accepted as the basis for moral considerability. Habermas's objection to allowing nature's interests to condition the dialogue are shown to be primarily epistemological rather than normative (that is, nature cannot speak, we cannot speak for nature and therefore it is not morally considerable). However, if these epistemological barriers are accepted as secondary to questions of morality, then non‐human beings ought to enter the circle of moral considerability and the idea of special discursive procedures for the incorporation of nature's interests becomes defensible. The precautionary principle is defended as one example of a convenient and parsimonious ‘decision rule’ which may incorporate and ‘represent’ nature's interests in practical discursive arenas.

This publication has 10 references indexed in Scilit: