Determinants of Bargaining Outcome in Single-family Housing Transactions: An Empirical Examination
- 1 April 1995
- journal article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Urban Studies
- Vol. 32 (3) , 605-614
- https://doi.org/10.1080/00420989550012997
Abstract
Using a hedonic regression model, this paper examines determinants of bargaining outcome in single-family housing transactions. It divides potential factors into three broad categories: dwelling attributes, site amenities, and seller's and buyer's characteristics. Results with use of 1990 data for the Reno-Sparks area in Nevada show that bargaining outcome is determined by seller's asking price, buyer's household income, and some of the dwelling attributes and site amenities. This paper concludes that factors affecting housing price do not necessarily affect bargaining outcome, and first-time home buyers do not statistically bargain less than repeat home buyers.Keywords
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