On the existence of franchise contracts and some of their implications
- 1 December 1992
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 10 (4) , 567-593
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-7187(92)90060-c
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 11 references indexed in Scilit:
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- Franchising: Firms, Markets, and Intangible AssetsSouthern Economic Journal, 1976