A control-theoretic view on incentives
- 1 March 1982
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Automatica
- Vol. 18 (2) , 167-179
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0005-1098(82)90106-6
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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