Property Rights and Finance
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Open Access
- 1 November 2002
- journal article
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Review
- Vol. 92 (5) , 1335-1356
- https://doi.org/10.1257/000282802762024539
Abstract
Which is the tighter constraint on private sector investment: weak property rights or limited access to external finance? From a survey of new firms in post-communist countries, we find that weak property rights discourage firms from reinvesting their profits, even when bank loans are available. Where property rights are relatively strong, firms reinvest their profits; where they are relatively weak, entrepreneurs do not want to invest from retained earnings.Keywords
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