International Games on Climate Change Control
Preprint
- 1 January 1998
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
In this paper a n-player non-cooperative game is used to model countries' decision of whether or not to sign an international agreement on climate change controKeywords
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