Recourse and Residential Mortgage Default: Evidence from U.S. States
- 25 February 2011
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
We quantify the effect of recourse on default. We find that recourse affects default through lowering the borrower's sensitivity to negative equity. At the mean value of the default option for defaulted loans, borrowers are 30% more likely to default in non-recourse states; for homes appraised at $500,000 to $750,000, borrowers are twice as likely to default in non-recourse states. We also find that, in states that allow deficiency judgments, defaults are more likely to occur through a lender-friendly procedure, such as a deed in lieu. We find no evidence that mortgage interest rates are lower in recourse states.Keywords
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