THE HAYEK HYPOTHESIS IN EXPERIMENTAL AUCTIONS: INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTS AND MARKET POWER
- 1 April 1991
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 29 (2) , 261-274
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1991.tb01270.x
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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