Restructuring Sovereign Debt
- 1 November 2003
- journal article
- Published by American Economic Association in Journal of Economic Perspectives
- Vol. 17 (4) , 75-98
- https://doi.org/10.1257/089533003772034907
Abstract
This paper provides new empirical evidence relevant to the debate over the desirability of reforms to the way that financial markets and the international community deal with sovereign debt crises. In particular, given the ongoing opposition of investors and some sovereigns to greater use of collective action clauses (CACs) in emerging market bonds, we present new evidence on the way that financial markets have priced the use or non-use of CACs.Keywords
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