On Monitoring and Collusion in Hierarchies
- 1 April 2000
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 91 (2) , 280-291
- https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2617
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 9 references indexed in Scilit:
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