Why do managers voluntarily release earnings forecasts?
- 1 March 1986
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Vol. 8 (1) , 53-71
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(86)90010-8
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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