Taking the Measure of Countermeasures: Leaders' Views on the Nation's Capacity to Develop Biodefense Countermeasures

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Abstract
HE PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY was to gather and analyze the views of leaders from academia, government, and industry regarding the capacity of the U.S. to develop biodefense countermeasures and to elicit their recom- mendations on steps that would improve the nation's ca- pacities to succeed in these efforts. The anthrax attacks of 2001 hinted at the kind of illness and civil disruption a few letters laden with Bacillus an- thracis spores could cause. The attacks also began to il- lustrate the grave impact that larger, more sophisticated bioattacks could have on the country. In the years since the attacks, the federal government has spent more than $14 billion on civilian biodefense, approximately $5 bil- lion of which has been allocated for research on and de- velopment of drugs and vaccines to counter bioterror agents.1 This year, the BioShield Act (P.L. 108-276) was passed, with one of its major purposes being to provoke the development of the medical countermeasures (i.e., therapeutic drugs, vaccines, and diagnostic tests) neces- sary to cope with bioattacks that might befall the nation in the future. As significant as these steps are, a number of biode- fense analysts and leaders from academia, government, and the pharmaceutical and biotech industries have con- cluded publicly and privately that the measures the U.S. government has taken to date, including the passage of the BioShield legislation, will not be enough to entice pharmaceutical industry leaders into this field and will not produce the countermeasures the nation needs for a truly effective biodefense.

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