Renegotiation-proof equilibria in repeated prisoners' dilemma
- 1 February 1989
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 47 (1) , 206-217
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90111-7
Abstract
No abstract availableAll Related Versions
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