Approaches to Reduction
- 1 June 1967
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 34 (2) , 137-147
- https://doi.org/10.1086/288137
Abstract
Four current accounts of theory reduction are presented, first informally and then formally: (1) an account of direct theory reduction that is based on the contributions of Nagel, Woodger, and Quine, (2) an indirect reduction paradigm due to Kemeny and Oppenheim, (3) an “isomorphic model” schema traceable to Suppes, and (4) a theory of reduction that is based on the work of Popper, Feyerabend, and Kuhn. Reference is made, in an attempt to choose between these schemas, to the explanation of physical optics by Maxwell's electromagnetic theory, and to the revisions of genetics necessitated by partial biochemical reductions of genetics. A more general reduction schema is proposed which: (1) yields as special cases the four reduction paradigms considered above, (2) seems to be in better accord with both the canons of logic and actual scientific practice, and (3) clarifies the problems of meaning variance and ontological reduction.Keywords
This publication has 5 references indexed in Scilit:
- On the Meaning of Scientific TermsThe Journal of Philosophy, 1964
- Ontological Reduction and the World of NumbersThe Journal of Philosophy, 1964
- The Structure of ScienceAmerican Journal of Physics, 1961
- On reductionPhilosophical Studies, 1956
- Interpretations of sets of conditionsThe Journal of Symbolic Logic, 1954