Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics
Preprint
- 1 January 2001
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
We develop a general dynamic model in which borrowing constraints arise endogenously as part of a constrained-efficient contract when borrowers face limited liaKeywords
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