Two Conceptions of Psychological Continuity
- 1 January 1998
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Explorations
- Vol. 1 (1) , 61-80
- https://doi.org/10.1080/10001998018538690
Abstract
In this article, I develop and defend a conception of psychological continuity that differs from the ‘orthodox’ conception in terms of overlapping chains of strongly connected mental states. By recognizing the importance of the (narrative) interrelatedness of qualitatively dissimilar mental contents, as well as the role of the body in psychological continuity, I argue, serious problems confronting the orthodox view can be solved.Keywords
This publication has 18 references indexed in Scilit:
- Personal IdentityPublished by Taylor & Francis ,2004
- RECENT WORK ON PERSONAL IDENTITYPhilosophical Books, 1993
- Personal Identity and the Causal Continuity RequirementThe Philosophical Quarterly, 1991
- Relation of implicit theories to the construction of personal histories.Psychological Review, 1989
- The content and organization of autobiographical memoriesPublished by Cambridge University Press (CUP) ,1988
- Ordinary everyday memories: Some of the things of which selves are madePublished by Cambridge University Press (CUP) ,1988
- Compound Emphasis and Causal RelataAnalysis, 1987
- Parfit, Circularity, and the Unity of ConsciousnessMind, 1987
- Personal IdentityThe Philosophical Review, 1971
- Essays on the Intellectual Powers of ManPublished by Oxford University Press (OUP) ,1785