Hierarchies, incentives and collusion in a model of enforcement
- 1 February 2002
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 47 (2) , 165-178
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0167-2681(01)00201-3
Abstract
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This publication has 8 references indexed in Scilit:
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