Foundations for Normative Planning
- 1 January 1978
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of the American Institute of Planners
- Vol. 44 (1) , 37-46
- https://doi.org/10.1080/01944367808976875
Abstract
Widely assumed in planning practice and theory is the “instrumental” view that planning can and must be limited to the “value-free” consideration of alternative public policy means. However, value-free planning is impossible in principle because planning is essentially political. In addition, attempts to deal with planning's “ethical” issues by pragmatic politics and claims to professionalism have been in adequate. More fundamentally, the work of contemporary philosophers suggests that, contrary to the “logical-positivist” position of the instrumental view, ethical decisions can be rationally justified in ways similar to those of the empirical sciences. This position provides the intellectual foundation for normative planning as the rational evaluation of both the means and ends of public policy.This publication has 23 references indexed in Scilit:
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