Liars Never Prosper? How Management Misrepresentation Reduces Monitoring Costs
- 31 October 1997
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Financial Intermediation
- Vol. 6 (4) , 269-306
- https://doi.org/10.1006/jfin.1997.0223
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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