The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions
- 12 December 1991
- book
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
Abstract
In this book, the authors theorize about the rationale and consequences of some economic institutions and contractual arrangements that are particularly predominant in poor agrarian economies. The models illustrate how some of the tools of advanced economic theory can be fruitfully used in understanding the aspects of age‐old agrarian institutions (like sharecropping, labour contracts, interlinked economic arrangements straddling labour, land, credit and product markets, producer and credit cooperatives, risk‐sharing institutions, etc.).Keywords
This publication has 100 references indexed in Scilit:
- An inquiry into quasi‐credit contracts: The role of reciprocal credit and interlinked deals in small‐scale fishing communitiesThe Journal of Development Studies, 1987
- Behavioural and material determinants of production relations in agricultureThe Journal of Development Studies, 1986
- On the stability of the cooperative type of organizationJournal of Comparative Economics, 1984
- Incentives and the Kibbutz: Toward an economics of communal work motivationJournal of Economics, 1983
- On the efficiency of a chinese-type work-point systemJournal of Comparative Economics, 1982
- Cooperation in a fixed-membership labor-managed enterpriseJournal of Comparative Economics, 1982
- On optimality in collective institutional choiceJournal of Comparative Economics, 1981
- Efficiency, incentives, and individual labor supply in the labor-managed firmJournal of Comparative Economics, 1981
- Collectives, communes, and incentivesJournal of Comparative Economics, 1980
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive gamesInternational Journal of Game Theory, 1975