A Voluntary Participation Game with a Non-excludable Public Good
- 1 February 1999
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 84 (2) , 227-242
- https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2476
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 15 references indexed in Scilit:
- Implementing a public project and distributing its costJournal of Economic Theory, 1992
- Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with a message space of minimal dimensionJournal of Economic Theory, 1990
- Characterizations of the pivotal mechanismJournal of Public Economics, 1986
- Voter Participation and Strategic UncertaintyAmerican Political Science Review, 1985
- Participation and the provision of discrete public goods: a strategic analysisJournal of Public Economics, 1984
- The pure theory of large two-candidate electionsPublic Choice, 1984
- A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl AllocationsEconometrica, 1981
- Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" ProblemEconometrica, 1977
- A simple model of imperfect competition, where 4 are few and 6 are manyInternational Journal of Game Theory, 1973
- The Pure Theory of Public ExpenditureThe Review of Economics and Statistics, 1954