Discontinuous Stackelberg solutions
- 1 December 1979
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Systems Science
- Vol. 10 (12) , 1359-1368
- https://doi.org/10.1080/00207727908941665
Abstract
This paper deals with a class of many-person non-zero-sum differential games in which one player has the role of ‘ leader ’ while the others ‘ follow ’. Necessary conditions are obtained for the existence of open-loop Stackelberg solutions under the assumption that the followers respond to the leader by selecting Nash equilibrium controls. Some simple investment problems are described which give rise to discontinuous optimal controls for both leader and follower(s).Keywords
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