Rapid responding increases belief bias: Evidence for the dual-process theory of reasoning
- 1 September 2005
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Thinking & Reasoning
- Vol. 11 (4) , 382-389
- https://doi.org/10.1080/13546780542000005
Abstract
In this study, we examine the belief bias effect in syllogistic reasoning under both standard presentation and in a condition where participants are required to respond within 10 seconds. As predicted, the requirement for rapid responding increased the amount of belief bias observed on the task and reduced the number of logically correct decisions, both effects being substantial and statistically significant. These findings were predicted by the dual-process account of reasoning, which posits that fast heuristic processes, responsible for belief bias, compete with slower analytic processes that can lead to correct logical decisions. Requiring rapid responding thus differentially inhibits the operation of analytic reasoning processes, leading to the results observed.Keywords
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