Abstract
This paper pays tribute to Tajfel's classic article 'Cognitive aspects of prejudice' and re-examines its central arguments. Tajfel's paper is important for outlining a social cognitive approach to the study of prejudice and also for refuting of what Tajfel called the 'blood-and-guts' approach. Taking Tajfel's proposition that social psychology is not value-free, the current paper examines the moral and political view of 'Cognitive aspects' and also the gaps in its approach to the study of prejudice. It is suggested that this cognitive approach has difficulty in accounting for extreme bigotry, at least without recourse to the motivational themes that the approach seeks to exclude. In particular, there would be limitations in applying this approach in order to understand the Holocaust. Indeed, Tajfel did not attempt to do so, for reasons that are discussed. Tajfel's Social Identity Theory (SIT) has similar limitations. The paper also examines Tajfel's use of the term 'depersonalization', which he described as a 'milder' form of dehumanization of out-groups. Later social identity theorists have tended to use 'depersonalization' differently, shifting their attention to in-groups. Their perspective moves away from understanding the topic of prejudice in the way that can be found in Tajfel's 'Cognitive aspects of prejudice'. Finally, the present paper suggests how extreme prejudice might be studied without returning to the motivational 'blood-and-guts' approach that Tajfel so cogently criticized.

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