Independence and Accountability

Preprint
Publisher Website
Google Scholar
    • preprint
      • Published in RePEc
Abstract
Why have central banks become more accountable and transparent in recent years? This paper considers a set of analytical models of monetary policy institutions to shed light on this. One conclusion it reaches is that uncertainty - regarding the central bank's inflation preferences or about the underlying model of the world - can generate inflationary problems which transparency can help counteract. This offers one rationale for the current monetary policy framework in the UK. The paper also constructs a quantitative index of accountability. This suggests that transparency has been pursued most actively by central banks with little independence and a low accrued stock of credibility. Again, this chimes with UK experience. A shorter version of this paper is forthcoming in "Toward more effective Monetary Policy" - proceedings of the Seventh Internal Conference sponsored by the Bank of Japan's Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies.
All Related Versions

This publication has 0 references indexed in Scilit: