Abstract
A pervasive but unexamined assumption of modern rhetorical and communication theory is that language is conventional, i.e., that the meanings of symbols are fixed arbitrarily by tacit human consensus and are “correct” only insofar as they conform to use patterns. In the criticism of social movements, this assumption has led to models of confrontational protest that judge activist rhetoric according to its ability to create new activist identities and persuade the establishment. Challenges to this assumption, while rare, are significant because they render such models problematic. This essay examines the challenge posed by the naturalist philosophy of language, i.e., the view that the meanings of symbols are fixed by “the way things are” and are “correct” insofar as they reflect the natures of their bearers. It compares the naturalist philosophy elaborated in Plato's Gratylus with that presented in an activist native American essay that argues for the preservation of traditional native languages.

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