CEO Stock-Based Compensation: An Empirical Analysis of Incentive-Intensity, Relative Mix, and Economic Determinants
Preprint
- 1 January 1999
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
The use of stock-based compensation for U.S. CEOs has increased significantly throughout the 1990s. Research interest, in particular on stock option compensation, has similarly increased, yet contradictory results create questions about the theoretical underpinnings. Therefore, we revisit the controversy surrounding stock option awards, and we further the understanding of restricted stock grants, which have escaped similar research focus. Using a recent data set, we obtain convincing empirical support for most theoretical predictions about stock option awards. We also find that restricted stock, due to its linear payoffs, are relatively inefficient in inducing risk-averse CEOs to accept risky, value-increasing investment projects.Keywords
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