Abstract
Discussion of the need for economic rationalization has led to increasing interest in alternative strategies to control fishing effort in efficient ways. Three basic alternatives are considered: taxation, control of fishing inputs ("limited entry"), and direct limitation of output through individual fisherman quotas. Each is analyzed in terms of specified elements of economic efficiency, distribution effects, freedom to choose fishing methods and strategies, and administrative feasibility. It is noted that in practice all would be used in combination with other direct measures to assure flexible control over fishing mortality. A number of common objections to economic rationalization of open access fisheries (e.g. creation of monopoly power, unemployment, failure to reduce consumer prices, and nonmonetary values associated with fishing) are analyzed and rejected as largely invalid. While the inherent short-term instability of commercial fishing and data problems preclude any "maximizing" model of a rationalized fishery, the prospects for workable programs leading to improved economic performance without adverse societal impacts are excellent. Key words: fishery economics, taxation, limited entry, quotas, open access fishery, sociological aspects

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