Abstract
The issue raised by the "historical" view of social psychology were discussed by Lewin as early as 1927. Lewin sharply separates historical and systematic analysis of psychological events. His distinction between "historical-geographic" concepts and "conditional-genetic" concepts is examined. Perhaps surprisingly, Lewin supports many of the views of the "historians," while rejecting their conclusion that laws are impossible. Lewin argues that lawful concepts are concrete, real, content-full and re fer to potentialities. They include feedback loops, values, and perceptual-cognitive variables and apply to unique events. Lewin's work is placed in a neo-Kantian tradition which con trasts with our dominant tradition which is based on Hume and Locke. This Lockean-Humean world view may be the source of much of our current frustration.

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