Spill‐over effects of intermittent costs for defection in social dilemmas

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Abstract
This research investigates the role of intermittent monetary costs in restraining individuals from defection in social dilemmas. In Experiment 1, 104 car owners made fictitious choices between a slow and a fast travel mode in the context of a continuous social dilemma. There were four different conditions of monetary costs for choosing the fast mode (defection): no cost, low cost, high cost to self, or high cost to others. Participants defected most when there was no cost and least when they themselves were charged a high cost. A spill‐over effect was obtained such that when others were charged a high cost to defect, defection rates were lower than under no cost. Experiment 2 used 36 undergraduates as participants in an iterated decision task with real groups. The results replicated the major results of Experiment 1. Furthermore, whereas prosocials were strongly affected by intermittent costs for defection (i.e. showed large spill‐over effects), proselfs seemed to be unaffected. Possible explanations of this interaction effect between social value orientation and intermittent punishment for defection are provided. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Funding Information
  • Swedish Transport and Communication and Research Board (98-0148)
  • Kyoto University Foundation
  • The Swedish Institute

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