A constitutional choice model of compensation for takings
- 31 December 1989
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in International Review of Law and Economics
- Vol. 9 (2) , 115-128
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0144-8188(89)90010-0
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 14 references indexed in Scilit:
- The Original Understanding of the Taking Clause Is Neither Weak nor ObtuseColumbia Law Review, 1988
- Takings, 1987Columbia Law Review, 1988
- Takings, Insurance, and Michelman: Comments on Economic Interpretations of "Just Compensation" LawThe Journal of Legal Studies, 1988
- An Economic Analysis of Legal TransitionsHarvard Law Review, 1986
- Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of PrecautionCalifornia Law Review, 1985
- Compensation for Takings: An Economic AnalysisCalifornia Law Review, 1984
- The Taking of Land: When Should Compensation be Paid?The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1984
- Expropriation of Private Property and the Basis for CompensationUniversity of Toronto Law Journal, 1979
- Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal AnalysisThe Yale Law Journal, 1977
- Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" LawHarvard Law Review, 1967