Budget institutions and political insulation: why states adopt the item veto
- 31 December 2003
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 87 (12) , 2677-2701
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0047-2727(02)00167-6
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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