A bargaining model of partisan appointments to the central bank
- 1 June 1992
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Monetary Economics
- Vol. 29 (3) , 411-428
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-3932(92)90034-y
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 7 references indexed in Scilit:
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