Asymmetric information and the termination of contracts in agencies*
- 1 March 1989
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Contemporary Accounting Research
- Vol. 5 (2) , 733-753
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1911-3846.1989.tb00736.x
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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