Some Economic Aspects of Ethical-Behavioural Codes

Publisher Website
Google Scholar
Abstract
Some informal rules merely save decision-making costs in social exchanges, but we try to use others as social contracts to produce public goods. (In fact, effective ethical-behavioural constraints may be essential to retention and the useful functioning of markets and democratic government.) Ethical-behavioural tenets are themselves public goods, however, adherence to them being vulnerable to cheap- or free-rider difficulties. In the long run, therefore, desirable informal laws will be underprovided. Nonetheless, according to both theory and observation, individuals sometimes overturn their free-riderism, compulsively sacrifice their selfish interests, and maintain useful customs and rules. Conditions that determine the costs and ‘indoctrinated’ or psychic rewards to individuals for their adherence are discussed. These conditions will shape the degree of underproduction of advantageous behavioural codes.

This publication has 0 references indexed in Scilit: