Dishonest signalling in a fiddler crab
- 7 April 2000
- journal article
- research article
- Published by The Royal Society in Proceedings Of The Royal Society B-Biological Sciences
- Vol. 267 (1444) , 719-724
- https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2000.1062
Abstract
Animal communication theory predicts that low–frequency cheating should be common in generally honest signalling systems. However, perhaps because cheats are designed to go undetected, there are few examples of dishonest signals in natural populations. Here we present what we believe is the first example of a dishonest signal which is used commonly by males to attract mates and fight sexual rivals. After losing their large claw, male fiddler crabs (Uca annulipes) grow a new one which has less mass, is a less effective weapon and costs less to use in signalling than an equivalent–length claw of the original form. Males with original claws do not differentially fight males with regenerated claws even though they are likely to win. Regenerated claws effectively bluff fighting ability and deter potential opponents before they fight. During mate searching, females do not discriminate against males with low–mass, regenerated claws, indicating that they are deceived as to the true costs males pay to produce sexual signals. Up to 44% of males in natural populations have regenerated claws, a level unanticipated by current signalling theory. The apparent rarity of cheating may be an artefact of the usual difficulty of detecting cheats and dishonesty may be quite common.Keywords
This publication has 16 references indexed in Scilit:
- Mate selection—A selection for a handicapPublished by Elsevier ,2004
- Good-genes effects in sexual selectionProceedings Of The Royal Society B-Biological Sciences, 1999
- Variation in courtship rate in the fiddler crab Uca annulipes: is it related to male attractiveness?Behavioral Ecology, 1998
- Honest signalling, perceptual error and the evolution of ‘all-or-nothing’ displaysProceedings Of The Royal Society B-Biological Sciences, 1994
- Dishonesty and the handicap principleAnimal Behaviour, 1993
- The corruption of honest signallingAnimal Behaviour, 1991
- Dyed birds achieve higher social status than controls in Harris' sparrowsAnimal Behaviour, 1985
- Intraspecific Deception by Bluffing: A Defense Strategy of Newly Molted Stomatopods (Arthropoda: Crustacea)Science, 1983
- Force, function and mechanical advantage in the chelae of the American lobster Homarus americanus (Decapoda: Crustacea)Journal of Zoology, 1981
- Status signalling in harris sparrows: Experimental deceptions achievedAnimal Behaviour, 1978