Commitment to regulatory bureaucracy
- 31 December 1986
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Information Economics and Policy
- Vol. 2 (4) , 243-258
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-6245(86)90002-8
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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