When Martyrdom Pays

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Abstract
Information was given subjects in the five experimental conditions about how their opponent-to-be in a forthcoming Prisoner's Dilemma game had played and fared in a game played previously. The information implied that the opponent-to-be had (1) played in a mutually cooperative game; (2) behaved as an exploited martyr; (3) successfully exploited his previous adversary; (4) made an unsuccessful attempt to exploit his previous adversary; or (5) been forced, by his previous adversary, to protect himself by competitive responses. A control condition gave no information about the previous game. Subjects tended to cooperate in conditions 1, 2, and 5, i.e., with opponents who appeared worthy of trust, and to compete in conditions 3, 4, and the control, i.e., with opponents who appeared to be exploitative. The high level of cooperation accorded the martyr was the most interesting result and was interpreted as behavior motivated by the equity norm.

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