What Makes Markets Allocationally Efficient?
- 1 May 1997
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Vol. 112 (2) , 603-630
- https://doi.org/10.1162/003355397555307
Abstract
What determines the allocative efficiency of markets? Why are double auctions, even with untrained human traders, allocationally efficient? We providKeywords
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