Credible coalitions and the core
- 1 June 1989
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 18 (2) , 185-187
- https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01268157
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 6 references indexed in Scilit:
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- A consistent bargaining setJournal of Economic Theory, 1989
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- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive gamesInternational Journal of Game Theory, 1975
- Chapter 1. A Survey of Cooperative Games Without Side PaymentsPublished by Walter de Gruyter GmbH ,1967