On the dominance of capitalists leadership in a ‘Feedback-Stackelberg’ solution of a differential game model of capitalism
- 1 September 1985
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
- Vol. 9 (1) , 101-125
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1889(85)90026-0
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 7 references indexed in Scilit:
- Nash and stackelberg solutions in a differential game model of capitalismJournal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 1983
- A Stackelberg solution of dynamic gamesIEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 1983
- Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent RelationshipEconometrica, 1981
- A class of trilinear differential gamesJournal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 1974
- The Dynamic Inefficiency of CapitalismJournal of Political Economy, 1973
- Additional aspects of the Stackelberg strategy in nonzero-sum gamesJournal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 1973
- On the Stackelberg strategy in nonzero-sum gamesJournal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 1973