Cooperative games and vector-valued criteria problems
- 1 April 1973
- journal article
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
- Vol. 18 (2) , 139-144
- https://doi.org/10.1109/tac.1973.1100263
Abstract
Quite often in a game there is not a strict conflict of interest among the players and they may agree to cooperate and help one another. In such cases, a solution that is Pareto optimal is attractive since it has the property that if any other solution is used at least one player does worse, or they all do the same. The same solution concept also applies to minimization problems with several cost criteria rather than a single scalar performance index. Necessary and sufficient conditions are given for Pareto-optimal solutions of static, continuous problems. An example is presented to illustrate the theory.Keywords
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