Industrial Concentration, Sectional Competition, and Antitrust Politics in America, 1880–1980
- 1 January 1986
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Studies in American Political Development
- Vol. 1, 142-214
- https://doi.org/10.1017/s0898588x00000353
Abstract
Antitrust law in the United States—framed in the Sherman, Clayton, and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) acts and their subsequent amendments—establishes a policy toward industrial concentration and business practices that sets the United States apart from other industrial democracies. In Europe and Japan, large-scale industry has been perceived as a national and international asset and, while particular abuses may be condemned at the government's discretion, emotional antibigness rhetoric and statutory prohibition of monopolistic practices are largely absent.Keywords
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