Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction
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- 1 April 2000
- journal article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Journal of Political Economy
- Vol. 108 (2) , 245-272
- https://doi.org/10.1086/262118
Abstract
I review the uses of economic theory in the initial design and later improvement of the ''simultaneous ascending auction,'' which was developed initially for the sale of radio spectrum licenses in the United States. I analyze some capabilities and limitations of the auction, the roles of various detailed rules, the possibilities for in- troducing combinatorial bidding, and some considerations in adapting the auction for sales in which revenue, rather than effi- ciency, is the primary goal.Keywords
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