Methodological conservatism and social epistemology
- 1 January 1994
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Studies in the Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 8 (3) , 247-264
- https://doi.org/10.1080/02698599408573499
Abstract
This paper defends two principles of methodological conservatism on the grounds that they help to promote an effective social structure for a knowledge‐seeking community. Conservatism has some prima facie justification because it provides for an effective division of cognitive labor, it promotes the effective use of scientific resources, and it provides for a certain amount of stability. However, the principles I defend in this paper should not be treated as absolute or unconditional criteria of theory‐choice, since they can be overridden by other rules or maxims. Since the decision to override a principle of conservatism depends on various contextual factors, the appropriateness of conservatism can vary from context to context.Keywords
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